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It is impossible to make a full assessment of the effects of federal taxation 
on charitable giving without considering the unique role played by philan- 
thropic foundations. Sometimes compared to banks or clearing houses,  I 
foundations act primarily as intermediaries between contributors and the 
nonprofit organizations that provide charitable or other exempt services. 
As such, foundations do not originate charitable transfers; they merely 
complete them. In 1982 American foundations made grants amounting to 
$3.2  billion, or about one-fifteenth the size of donations by living individ- 
uals (Giving U.S.A. 1983, p. 36). Since these grants were made possible 
only by earlier contributions or bequests, it is improper to add foundation 
grants together with current contributions from all other sources. To do 
so would result in a double counting of gifts passing through foundations. 
Despite this intermediary role, foundations and their tax treatment loom 
large in the consideration of  tax policy and the philanthropic sector. Tax 
provisions regarding foundations affect not only their institutional behav- 
ior but the nature and amount of gifts they receive. 
The first section of this chapter provides a brief outline of the history, 
structure, and function of charitable foundations in the United States. 
The second section describes recent tax provisions affecting foundations, 
focusing particularly on the Tax Reform Act of  1969. The third section 
discusses the effects of  tax laws-with  emphasis on the 1969 act-on  the 
behavior of foundations and potential donors. No econometric analysis is 
discussed because virtually none exists in this area comparable to the stud- 
ies of tax effects in other areas of charitable behavior. 
1.  See, for example, Nielson 1979, p. vii, and Ture and Feulner in Butler 1980, p. ix. 
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7.1  Background 
The modern charitable foundation traces its legal roots back into antiq- 
uity, but it was not until the twentieth century that its present form became 
solidified. Through a foundation, one or more individuals can establish a 
permanent mechanism to manage a sum of  money and make charitable 
grants from it. The purposes to which the grants are to be applied may be 
stated in quite general terms. The tasks of managing the principal and dis- 
tributing grants are left to directors or trustees who may well be related to 
the donor, but most of the largest foundations have come to be directed 
and operated by professionals and others largely unrelated to the donors. * 
It is useful to distinguish several types of foundations, both for descrip- 
tive purposes and for the sake of understanding relevant tax legislation. 
The most visible are the large private institutions such as the Ford and 
Rockefeller foundations.  There are many more smaller foundations of 
similar structure, most of which were established by the gifts of  a single 
family or individual. Together these foundations are referred to as private 
nonoperating  foundations.  They are “nonoperating”  because, for the 
most part, they make grants to other organizations rather than supplying 
services directly. In addition, their endowments come largely from one or 
several gifts from an individual or family rather than from the continuing 
support of a large number of contributors. It is the tax treatment of these 
private nonoperating foundations that has inspired the most intense poli- 
cy debate in this area of nonprofit activity, and these foundations are the 
focus of the present chapter. 
In order to point up the distinguishing features of private nonoperating 
foundation;,  it is useful to mention four other general categories of foun- 
dations. First, company foundations are those closely allied to firms, and 
their function is discussed in chapter 5. Second, community foundations 
(known also as community trusts) serve to centralize the administration 
for separate charitable funds in a community or region. Third, “operating 
foundations” such as endowed research or social-welfare organizations 
provide tax-exempt services directly. Although they are strictly a kind of 
private foundation, they act as ordinary charitable organizations rather 
than as grant-making entities. Finally, it is useful to distinguish a group of 
organizations that operate by attracting contributions from a wide spec- 
trum of contributors and funneling that money to research or service or- 
ganizations.  Exemplified by  organizations supporting health-related re- 
search, such “public charities”  do not provide services directly, but are 
distinguished from private foundations by the breadth of their support  .3 
2. For historical descriptions of foundations, see Freemont-Smith 1965 or Karl and Katz 
3. See Petska (1982a, p. 9) for examples of public charities or Freemont-Smith (1965, p. 
1981. 
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For the sake of clarity in evaluating data on foundations, it is important to 
note that the legal definition of private foundation-on  which govern- 
ment statistics and tax treatment are based-covers  more than just private 
nonoperating foundations. In particular, the definition of a private foun- 
dation as used by the IRS includes operating charities that fail to meet cer- 
tain standards of public support (so-called failed public charities) or other 
conditions. Not only does this definition have important implications for 
the tax treatment of insitutions,  it also means that government data on 
private foundations includes some number of organizations that do not 
conform to the usual definition of grant-making, nonoperating founda- 
tions. In fact, most private foundations are grant-making and nonoperat- 
ing, thus conforming to the definition of private nonoperating  founda- 
tions.  Community  foundations  and  most  operating  charities  are  not 
included in the IRS definition of private foundations. The distinction be- 
tween private nonoperating foundations and the legal definition of pri- 
vate foundations is noted below in discussing the size and composition of 
the foundation sector. 
Table 7.1 provides some idea of the magnitudes of the various founda- 
tion types,  based on a sample of  large foundations  for  1979. Private 
nonoperating foundations constitute by far the most important category, 
accounting for 78 percent of these large foundations and 88 percent of 
their   asset^.^  Company foundations accounted for 5 percent of assets, 
while community  and operating foundations together  made up the re- 
maining 7 percent.  As a percentage of assets, current contributions re- 
ceived by  foundations were most important to company foundations, 
which is quite consistent with the idea that such foundations smooth out 
contributions rather than serve as repositories of endowmenks In con- 
trast, current contributions received by private nonoperating foundations 
accounted for only 1.4  percent of assets, reflecting the general dominance 
of initial gifts relative to continuing outside support. Grants made by pri- 
vate nonoperating foundations amounted to 5.6 percent of assets, or four 
times as large as contributions received. In contrast, company founda- 
tions paid out slightly less than their receipts of contributions, though 
both amounts were large relative to total assets. The grants of community 
foundations were less than a third of their contributions received, and 
grants by operating foundations were of little importance. 
7.1.1  Size and Function of Private Foundations 
Because of the central role of private foundations in discussion of tax 
policy and recent tax legislation, it is useful to take a closer look at this 
segment of the foundation world. Based on mandatory tax and informa- 
4.The Foundation Center uses the term independent  foundorion for private foundations 
5. For a further discussion of this point, see chapter 5. 
(Foundation  Directory 1981, p. ix). Table 7.1  Assets, Contributions Received, and Grants Made for Large Foundations by Type, 1979 (dollar amounts in millions) 
Private  Company 
Nonoperatinga  Sponsored  Community  Operating  All 
~ 
Numberb  2,618  602  95  48  3,363 
Contributions received  $  478  $  509  $  345  $  24  $  1,356 
Grants made  $  1,910  $  438  $  102  $  33  $  2,483 
Assets  $33,829  $2,008  $1,655  $1,061  $38,553 
As percentage of assets  I .4  25.3  20.8  2.3  3.5 
As percentage of assets  5.6  21.8  6.2  3.1  6.4 
Source: Foundation Directory 1981, p. vii. 
aIdentified as “independent” foundation by the Foundation Center. 
bAll foundations meeting specific size criteria were included in this tabulation. 257  Foundations 
tion returns,  the  IRS estimated that  there were almost  28,000 private 
foundations in 1979. As large a number as this appears to be, returns for 
private foundations represented in 1975 only a quarter of the returns filed 
by  all exempt organizations and only 7 precent of  all expenditures for 
exempt purposes (Petska 1982a, p. 9). Of the 28,000 private foundations 
identified for  1979, IRS data indicate  that  some 27,000 were  private 
nonoperating foundations (Petska 1982a, p. 23, table 9). In contrast, the 
Foundation Center estimated that there were only about 22,000 private 
nonoperating  foundations in  1979 (Foundation Directory  1981, p. vii). 
Available data do not allow a precise determination of the reason for this 
discrepancy; thus it is impossible to determine how closely the IRS data on 
private foundations corresponds to the universe of private nonoperating 
foundations. Table 7.2 presents the size distribution of private nonoperat- 
ing foundations, as defined by the IRS. Probably the most striking aspect 
of the table is the uneven distribution of assets among these foundations. 
Over half the foundations had less than $100,000 in assets; this group to- 
gether accounted for only about 1  percent of total assets. At the other end, 
the largest 490 foundations (1.7 percent of the total) had 65 percent of to- 
tal assets. A small minority of foundations thus accounted for the bulk of 
foundation assets.6 
In order to suggest the areas of philanthropic activity in which founda- 
tions are involved, table 7.3 provides a breakdown of the number and as- 
sets of private foundations by major activity in 1974. Both operating and 
nonoperating private foundations are included in this tabulation. Of the 
Table 7.2  ‘Number and Assets of Private Nonoperating Foundations, 1979 
Asset Classa  Number of  Percentage  Total Assetsb  Percentage 
($ thousands)  Foundations  of Total  ($ millions)  of Total 
Zero or not 
reported 
Under $25 
$25 under 100 
$100 under 500 
$500 under 1000 
$1000under 10,000 
$10,000under 50,000 
$50,000 or more 
TOTAL 
1,444  5.3 
8,092  30.0 
5,598  20.8 
6,383  23.7 
1,961  7.3 
2,921  10.9 
457  1.7 
109  0.4 
26,970  100.0 
59 
98 
















Source: Petska 1982a, p. 24, table 10. 
aMarket value. 
bBook value. 
6. The difference in asset sizes for the largest foundations identified by tables 7.1 and 7.2 
appears to be due to the use of market value of assets in table 7.1 compared to book value in 
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Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of  Income-1974-1978,  Private Foundations 1981 ,pp. 25-26, table 1. 
aNot reported separately. 
bTotal includes foundations engaged in farming activities, not shown separately. 260  Foundations 
specified activity areas, foundations accounting for 10 percent of total as- 
sets were devoted to the support of schools and colleges. Foundations 
with another 6 percent of assets were concerned with cultural and histori- 
cal purposes, including museums and libraries. Foundations with 4 per- 
cent of assets had religious aims. By  far the largest number of  founda- 
tions, representing 58 percent of total private foundation assets, fell into 
the residual category, “activities directed to organizations not elsewhere 
classified.” This reflects the generality of purpose with which most of the 
largest foundations were established-a  generality that has allowed their 
trustees and directors considerable latitude to direct grants over time. Op- 
erating foundations constitute a significant part of several categories al- 
though they account for only a small portion of total private foundation 
assets. In the housing, other instruction and training, conservation and 
environmental, and scientific research classes, operating foundations ac- 
counted for over half of total assets. 
7.2  Tax Treatment of  Foundations 
Few areas of tax policy have aroused more heated debate than the tax 
treatment of private foundations. As it developed in the early twentieth 
century, the legal form of the foundation received several distinct advan- 
tages: it could accumulate income without taxation, it could operate in 
perpetuity subject to the most general stated objective, and (after 1917) 
individuals making contributions to it could deduct those contributions in 
calculating their income taxes.’ These advantages obviously gave founda- 
tions considerable autonomy and freedom from the hand of government. 
This autonomy has been defended as essential to the basic function of 
foundations in society. Stating that foundations offer a vital independent 
source of support for new ideas, proponents have argued that the taxation 
and regulation of foundations should be kept to a minimum.* 
The special treatment  of  foundations has also received considerable 
criticism, and this opposition is apparent in the history of  tax legislation 
regarding foundations. In 1915 the Walsh Commission attacked the con- 
centration of wealth and influence in foundations and recommended limi- 
tations on their size, autonomy, and lifetimes (Freemont-Smith 1965, p. 
51; Karl and Katz 1981, p. 249). Suspicion of foundations rose during the 
1940s as foundations grew and abuses by foundations were made public. 
It was apparent that some donors derived economic benefit from estab- 
lishing foundations. By making gifts of nonvoting stock or retaining con- 
trol of the foundation, a donor could receive an immediate tax deduction 
7. See Freemont-Smith (1965) for a discussion of the legal status of  foundations, in par- 
8. See, for example, statements by Brewster quoted by Simon in U.S. Congress, Senate, 
ticular the cy pres doctrine related to the foundation’s objective. 
Committee on Finance 1973  p. 179, or Ture and Feulner in Butler 1980. 261  Foundations 
without relinquishing control of  a family business, for example. Or a do- 
nor could use his control to have the foundation make favorable grants or 
loans. In 1950 Congress passed a tax on the unrelated business income as 
well as restrictions on deferral of charitable gifts and transactions between 
donors and foundations. Congress showed further disfavor toward pri- 
vate foundations in 1964 by giving preferential tax treatment to “public 
charities”-organizations  receiving “a substantial part” of  their support 
from the public. The limit on charitable contributions to such public char- 
ities was raised from 20 to 30 percent of  income, but the limit on gifts to 
private foundations remained at 20 percent. The justification given for 
this discrimination was the delay that commonly occurred between the es- 
tablishment  of  a private foundation and  actual grant-making activity 
(Nielson 1972, pp. 372-73; Freemont-Smith 1965, p. 160). A special Trea- 
sury study undertaken about this time confirmed that many private foun- 
dations did in fact pay out very small proportions of their assets. Table 7.4 
presents a tabulation based on that study. It shows that over 9 percent of 
private foundations paid out 1 percent or less of their assets in 1962. To 
what extent these low rates of  payout were due to a deliberate policy of 
capital accumulation or to the practice of some foundations to hold low- 
yield company stock is ~nclear.~ 
By 1969 there was strong sentiment in Congress to restrict private foun- 
dations further. Not only were the low payout rates a source of concern, 
there were also continuing problems with donors’ attempts to control and 
manipulate foundations for personal gain (Nielson 1972, p. 373). Accord- 
ing to foundation critic Congressman Wright Patman, foundations had 
by means of their tax exemption become “perverted into a vehicle for in- 
stitutionalized, deliberate evasion of fiscal and moral responsibility to the 
nation” (Nielson 1972, p. 9). 
As a result of concerns such as these, Congress enacted a set of  funda- 
mental changes in the tax treatment of private foundations as a part of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969. The act provided for the first time a definition of 
private foundations.  They were defined as nonprofit charitable institu- 
tions other than operating charitable organizations  (such as churches, 
schools, hospitals,  and the like), charitable organizations  with  broad- 
based public support, organizations supporting any of the above, or orga- 
nizations that test for the public safety.’O The act contained four sets of 
provisions related to private foundations. First, it established a minimum 
rate of payout or distribution of grants as a percentage of  investment as- 
sets.  After  a  phase-in  period  for existing  foundations,  the  minimum 
9. Worthy (1975, p. 244) states that foundations with major holdings in one corporation 
experienced lower rates of return. 
10. Internal Revenue Code 1982, sec. 509(a). Broadly based organizations were those re- 
ceiving over a third of their income from the general public in contributions, sales, or mem- 
bership fees and less than a third from investment or unrelated business income. Table 7.4  Percentage Distribution of Private Foundations  by Payout Rate and Asset Size, 1962 
Asset Size 
Ratio of Grants 
to  Book  Net Worth 
(percent)  Total 
Under  $100,oO0 to 
$100,oO0  1 ,~,oO0 
$1  ,oO0,oO0  Over 
1o,oO0,oO0  $10,oO0,oO0 
Otol 
1 to3 
3 to 6 
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Source: Testimony of H. Lawrence Fox in U.S.  Congress, Senate, Committee on  Finance 1974a, pp. 146-47.  Based on  Treasury Department Survey of Pri- 
vate Foundations (U.S. Congress, Senate 1965, p. 87). 263  Foundations 
payout rate was to be the greater of the foundation’s actual investment in- 
come and a predetermined rate, originally set at 6 percent. This provision 
was a straightforward remedy for what were seen as insufficiently low 
rates of  distribution by some foundations, as noted above. If funds were 
put into foundations but never expended for charitable purposes, many 
felt that it was difficult to  justify the deduction for the original payment. 
The act’s second provision was to impose an excise tax, originally at a rate 
of 4 percent, on the investment income of private foundations. The third 
provision that affected private foundations did so indirectly. This percent- 
age-of-income ceiling on deductible contributions was raised from 30 to 
50 percent  for exempt  organizations  other  than private  nonoperating 
foundations; the percentage applying to private foundations remained at 
20 percent. In addition, gifts exceeding the 20 percent limit were not eligi- 
ble for carryover, and gifts of appreciated assets to private foundations 
were reduced by the capital gains exclusion rate as applied to the apprecia- 
tion.” 
Finally, the 1969 act imposed a set of regulatory measures intended to 
limit the potential for abuse by donors. Most important, that law prohib- 
ited “self-dealing” transactions between a foundation and its substantial 
donors and their families, including such transactions as loans, employ- 
ment, purchases,  or transfers of property. Previously such transactions 
were permitted if  the donor and foundation acted independently and if 
the terms were no more favorable than could be obtained on the open 
market. This “arms-length” criterion had been difficult to enforce, how- 
ever.l2 Next, the act limited a donor’s power to maintain control over a 
foundation through the transfer of company stock. According to the act, 
a private foundation together with its major donors could hold no more 
than 20 percent of the voting stock of a corporation.  Phase-in periods 
were allowed for foundations to divest themselves of any excess. Another 
provision required foundations to verify that grants to other foundations 
or to nonexempt organizations were actually used for their stated pur- 
poses. In addition to these provisions, private foundations were limited in 
their ability to make risky investments, participate in politics, make grants 
to individuals, or engage in nonexempt activities.  l3 Taken together, these 
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 constituted a sweeping change 
in the tenor and substance of tax law regarding foundations. Even so, they 
11. For a description of these provisions, see U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of 
lncome-1974-1978,  Private Foundations 1981, p. 5, or Foundation Directory 1981, p. xii. 
12. Internal Revenue Code 1982, sec. 4946 specifies those disqualified from making such 
transactions. For a comparison of the rules on self-dealing before and after the 1969 act, see 
US.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income--1974-1978,  Private Foundations 1981, 
13. See Labovitz 1974, pp. 64-71; U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income- 
1974-1978, Private Foundations 1981, pp. 5-7;  or 1980 U.S.  Master Tax Guide (1979, pp. 
192-94) for more detailed descriptions of these provisions. 
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are less stringent than some proposals, such as a provision rejected by the 
Senate to place a  forty-year  limit on the lives  of  private  foundations 
(Council on Foundations 1977, p. 1559). The effects of these changes are 
the principal topic in section 7.3 below. 
Since 1969 there has been some easing in the tax provisions related to 
private foundations.  In 1976 the fixed portion of the minimum payout 
rate was lowered from 6 to 5 percent, and in 1981 the requirement that the 
payout rate meet or exceed the actual rate of return on investments was 
dropped, leaving a simple minimum payout rate of 5 percent. The excise 
tax on investment income also was reduced in 1978 to 2 percent.14 Recent- 
ly, proposals for more favorable treatment of private foundations have re- 
ceived  increasing  attention.  Hearings  in  1983 covered  such  possible 
changes as repeal of the 2 percent tax and easing of the divestiture rules.I5 
Also under consideration was a proposal to end discrimination against 
private foundations in the deduction ceiling and rules concerning gifts of 
appreciated assets.  l6 
As the law stood following the 1981 tax act, the rules governing private 
foundations could be quite important in the contribution decisions of 
some taxpayers.  A donor’s gift would generally fall under  the private 
foundation provisions as long as he or his appointees retained control 
over the disposition of funds after the gift was credited. A donor could 
obtain a higher limit on gifts (30 percent) by giving up some control and 
establishing a support organization directed jointly by representatives of 
the donor and a charity.17  In order to have the maximum deduction limits 
apply, a donor would have to relinquish control over the funds at the time 
of the gift;, he would have to be content to influence the use of his contri- 
bution through a restricted endowment fund or recommendations to the 
charitable organization. For a class of large donors, however, the control 
available through the foundation form makes other forms of giving much 
less attractive. Important questions for tax policy concern the effect of 
these provisions on the creation of new private foundations, on the sup- 
port of existing foundations, and on charitable giving in general. The fol- 
lowing section addresses these questions. 
7.3  The Impact of the 1969 Tax Reform Act on Foundations 
Called “the most far-reaching legislation affecting private philanthropy 
in our two hundred-year  history” (Worthy 1975, p. 232), the Tax Reform 
Act of  1969 has elicited widespread opposition  among spokesmen for 
14. SeeFoundutionDirectory 1981, pp. xii, 12, and Sugarmanand Feinberg 1981, p. 5. 
15. Hearings of the Subcommittee on  Oversight of  the Committee on  Ways and Means 
16. See, for example, “Tax Report,”  WullStreet Journal, 25 May 1983, p.  1. 
17. See InternulRevenue Code (1982, sec. 509(a)(3))  or Sugarman and Feinberg (1981, pp. 
covering rules for private foundations were held on  17-30 June 1983. 
8-1 1) for restrictions regarding support organizations. 265  Foundations 
foundations amid predictions of  irreparable harm. Taggart stated omi- 
nously following the bill’s passage: “The bell may well have faintly tolled 
for the private foundation; it is now to be found only in captivity and 
there are strong doubts about its ability to reproduce” (Taggart 1970, p. 
63). Butler (1980, p. 14) agreed, saying the act will “jeopardize the exis- 
tence of foundations.” 
In order to assess predictions such as these, it is useful to consider two 
sets of influences likely to have emanated from the 1969 act. First, the 
act’s provisions are likely to affect the operation of  private foundations, 
from its investment policy to its policies for making grants. Second, one 
would expect the act’s provisions to affect the attractiveness of founda- 
tions as a vehicle for individual contributions or bequests. To the extent 
that the act’s new restrictions lessen the attractiveness of the private foun- 
dation in relation to other means of giving-trusts  or direct gifts to chari- 
ties-it  is reasonable to expect some substitution in favor of other forms. 
It is also possible that increases in other forms of giving will not compen- 
sate and that overall charitable giving will decline. Needless to say, effects 
on the operation of  foundations and effects on contributions to founda- 
tions may also interact. Reductions in gifts may affect grant-making and 
investment decisions; restrictions on business dealings may affect the es- 
tablishment of foundations. At the outset, it should be emphasized that as 
yet there exists little empirical investigation of these effects. What follows 
is a description of the available data relevant to the impact of tax law, and 
the 1969 law in particular, on foundations. The primary pieces of data re- 
late to payout rates, other effects on foundation operations, donor sup- 
port, and overall growth. 
7.3.1  Payout Rate 
A central pillar of the 1969 legislation was the requirement that private 
foundations distribute some minimum percentage of their assets annually. 
The provision arose out of concern that the immediate charitable deduc- 
tions allowed at the establishment of  a foundation might not be matched 
by actual grants to operating charitable organizations until much later. As 
Steuerle (1977, p. 1665) has pointed out, much of the discussion over this 
payout requirement has focused on the question of what rate would be ap- 
propriate, considering the investment opportunities open to foundations. 
Probably the most useful question that can be posed in assessing the im- 
pact of the provision is whether the requirement actually increased payout 
rates. Since payout rates may be influenced by the rate at which contribu- 
tions are received as well as by the performance of portofolios, however, it 
is impossible to isolate the requirement’s independent effect. For exam- 
ple, Labovitz found that the median rate of return received by a sample of 
foundations fell between 1967 and 1970 for each asset group observed. As 
he suggests, these movements appear to be largely the effect of poor stock 266  Foundations 
market performance (Labovitz 1974, pp. 89-92).  In another analysis us- 
ing a sample of  326 large foundations, Cushman (1979, pp. 155-56 table 
6.3) found that the average payout rate rose from 4.2 to 6.6 percent be- 
tween  1968 and 1973. Table 7.5 presents aggregate data on foundation 
distributions for various years, using two different series of data. The first 
data set covers all foundations. The second includes only a sample of the 
largest ones. The former shows a general rise in payout rates from the ear- 
ly or mid-1960s  to 1979 while the second does not suggest any clear trend. 
Comparisons over time such as those in table 7.5 are hampered, however, 
because the calculated rates are based on different sample sizes, the small- 
er samples tending to be dominated by the largest foundations. In order to 
assess the implication of differing compositions of  small and large foun- 
dations, it is useful to turn briefly to a consideration of the effect of asset 
size on rates of distribution. 
The payout rates in the IRS sample covering all foundations are slightly 
higher than that based on the sample of large foundations. Most likely this 
difference reflects the generally higher payout  rates  for small founda- 
Table 7.5  Payout Rates for Foundations Based on 'Ik.0 Data Series (dollar 
amounts in millions) 
IRS Information Returns (990-PF): All Private Foundations 
Number of  Total  Contributions  As Percentage 
Year  Foundationsa  Assetsb  Paid  of Assets 
1962  14,865  $16,262  $1,012  6.2 
1974  26,889  n.a  1,953  n.a. 
1977  27,691  34,817  2,289  6.6 
1978  29,659  36,135  2,764  7.5 
1979  27,980  44,648  2,801  6.3 
Foundation Center Surveys of Large Foundations 
Number of  Total  As Percentage 
Year'  Foundationsd  Assetsb  Grants  of  Assets 
1965  6,803  $19,927  $1,212  6.1 
1969  5,454  25,181  1,513  6.0 
1972  2,533  31,510  1,548  4.9 
1975  2,818  28,635  1,808  6.3 
1977  3,138  32,359  2,062  6.4 
1979  3,363  38,553  2,365  6.1 
Sources: Petska 1982b, p. 25; Foundation Directory 1967, p. 15; 1971, p. xi; 1975, p. xvi; 
1977, p. xvii; 1979, p. xiv, 1981, p. vii. 
aIncludes non-grant-making foundations. 
bMarket value. 
'Years  covered by surveys are approximate. 
dlncludes all foundations meeting specific size criteria in each year. 267  Foundations 
tions, as indicated in table 7.6 for 1979. Expressed as a percentage of the 
book value of assets, payout rates ranged from 74 percent for foundations 
with less than $25,000 in assets to 6.5 percent for foundations with assets 
over $50 million. These payout rates correspond closely to the rates at 
which contributions were received. The implication of these differences, 
noted by Petska (1982a, p.  14), is that a percentage payout requirement 
such as that in the 1969 act poses a more serious constraint on large foun- 
dations than small ones, because of  the latter’s greater access to annual 
contributions as a source of  funding. This suggestion finds support in ta- 
ble 7.7, which gives the required and actual distributions. While founda- 
tions in the lowest asset class distributed over three times what they were 
required to, the grants of the largest foundations exceeded the required 
amount by only 11 percent. To the extent that the payout requirement ac- 
tually constrains the behavior of any foundations, therefore, its effect is 
most likely to be felt among the largest foundations, those least likely to 
receive a large portion of their incomes in the form of contributions. 
Any increase in the payout rate, other things equal, will reduce the rate 
at  which  foundation  assets  grow.  One  frequently  expressed  concern 
among critics of the 1969 payout requirements is that they would force 
managers to “invade corpus’’ and distribute some portion of assets annu- 
ally.  Alternatively, foundations  would  be  forced to switch away from 
growth stocks paying few dividends to assets offering higher interest rates 
but no growth opportunities. Indeed, one argument for payout require- 
ments has been that foundations should not grow over time unless they 
Table 7.6 
+
  Gifts Received and Grants Made by Private Foundations, 1979 
Gifts Received  Gifts Paid Out 
Asset Sizea  Total  As Percentage  Total  As Percentage 
(thousands)  ($ millions)  of Assetsb  ($ millions)  of Assetsb 
Zero or not 
reported 
Under $25 
$25  under  100 
$100 under  500 
$500 under  1,000 
$1  ,OOO  under 
10,Ooo 
$1O,Ooo  under 
50,000 




















16  26.6 
75  74.2 
59  17.3 
193  11.5 
145  10.9 
716  8.7 
652  7.8 
946  6.5 
2,801  8.1 
Source:  Petska  1982a, p.  16, table 2. 
aMarket value. 
bBook value. 268  Foundations 
Table 7.7  Required and Actual Distributions for Exempt Purposes for 
Nonoperating Foundations, 1979 
Required  Actual  Required as 
Number of  Distributiona  Distribution  Percentage of 
Asset Class  Foundations  ($ millions)  ($ millions)  Actual 
Under 
$100,00Ob  15,833  83.4  279.5  29.8 
$100,000  under 
1,OWOOO  7,862  196.9  375.1  52.4 
$1,OOO,OOO 
under 
lO,OOo,OOO  2,761  559.3  786.5  71.1 
more  514  1610.7  1791.6  89.9 
TOTAL  26,970  2450.3  3233.3  75.8 
$10,000,000  or 
Source: Petska 1982a, p. 26, table 12. 
a"Distributable amount." 
bIncludes foundations with assets not reported. 
continue to receive contributions. As Steuerle has noted, the real value of 
foundation assets will grow as long as the payout rate is not more than the 
sum of the real rate of return and the growth rate of assets due to new con- 
tributions (Steuerle 1977, pp. 1673-75.). In fact, the real value of  private 
foundation assets has increased. Converting the asset values shown in ta- 
ble 7.5 to 1972 dollars shows an increase in real market value from $23.0 
billion in !962 to $27.4 billion in 1979 (Petska 1982b, p. 25). To summa- 
rize the evidence on payout rates, it seems likely that the law has been a 
binding constraint for some, mostly larger, foundations. The time-series 
evidence on payout rates is inconclusive, however, because the Founda- 
tion Center's sample was reduced between 1969 and 1972, raising the aver- 
age size of the foundations included, and thus tending to lower observed 
payout rates. In any case, there is as yet no clear evidence to suggest that 
the payout requirement-in  combination with asset yields and contribu- 
tions received-has  led to a decline in real asset values. 
7.3.2  Formation of  and Contributions to Foundations 
Probably the most important measure of the impact of the 1969 legisla- 
tion on private foundations is the law's effect on their creation and sup- 
port  by  individual  donors.  The predictions  of  doom  for foundations 
would indeed come about if  the new restrictions on foundations caused 
potential donors to make other kinds of charitable gifts or forego making 
contributions altogether. In his testimony before the Finance Committee 
in  1973, John Simon argued that the 1969 lelgislation had reduced the 
birth rate of  new foundations. He presented evidence that the number of 269  Foundations 
new private foundations appearing annually had fallen by over half be- 
tween 1969 and 1973 (U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance 1973, pp. 173- 
75). 
In order to examine the possible effect of the 1969  act on the creation of 
new foundations, tables 7.8 and 7.9 present information on the number of 
foundations established over time. Table 7.8 displays the year of estab- 
lishment for two samples of large foundations for 1969  and 1979. It shows 
that the number of births in the 1970s was only a third the level of the 
1960s. However, it also shows that, in both samples, the 1950s was the 
most active period for the creation of large foundations: the number of 
foundations established in the 1960s was 40 percent less than the level for 
the 1950s. Table 7.9 shows, in the last two columns, the yearly average of 
the number of foundations receiving their tax exemption and their assets 
as of 1974 over several different periods from 1920 to 1974. In agreement 
with table 7.8, the period  1950-59 represented the most active (as mea- 
sured by assets) period for the establishment of foundations. By this mea- 
sure the decade of the 1960s was nearly as active, but the figures for that 
decade include institutions that had previously been established without 
securing official tax-exempt certification.ls From 1970 to 1974, founda- 
tions with average assets of $421 million have been established annually, 
Table 7.8  Period of Establishment of Large Foundations 
1969 Sample  1979 Sample 
Period  Number  Percentage  Number  Percentage 
Before 1900  18  0.3 
1900- 1909  16  0.3 
1910-1919  75  1.4 
1920- 1929  157  2.9 
1930- 1939  259  4.8 
1940- 1949  1134  20.9 
1950- 1959  2546  46.8 
1960- 1969  1231  22.6 
1970-1979  -  - 
5436  100.0 
25  0.8 
17  0.5 
58  1.7 
136  4.1 
176  5.3 
625  18.8 
1272  38.3 
759  22.8 
255  7.7 
3323  100.0 
Source: Foundation Directory: 1969 Sample: 1971, p. x; 1979  Sample: 1981, p. xiv. 
Note: Samples for tabulation consist of  all foundations meeting specific size criteria in each 
year. For the 1969 sample, foundations with grants of $25,000 or more or with assets of 
$500,000 or more were included (Foundation Directory 1971, p. vii). For the 1979 sample, 
the comparable amounts were $100,000 in grants or $I million in assets (1981, p. vii). 
18. See US.  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of  Income-1974-78,  Private Founda- 
tions 1981, p. 24, for an explanation of the process by which institutions were granted tax- 
exempt status. 270  Foundations 
Table 7.9  Number and Assets of  Foundations by Year  in Which Tax 
Exemption Was Obtained 
Annual Average 
Total for Period  for Period 
Number of  Assets  Number of  Assets 















































Source: Internal Revenue Service, Stafisfics  of Income-1974-1978,  Privafe Foundations 
1981, p. 93, table 18. 
much below the rate for the 1950s.l9  To summarize, the decline in the birth 
rate of new foundations began before the enactment of  the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 and appears to have accelerated slightly after it. Whether the 
act had an independent effect on this rate cannot be determined, however, 
on the basis of  existing data.  Not  only might nontax influences have 
changed over the period, but some of the decline in the 1960s may have 
been due.to actual or anticipated restrictions on foundations felt during 
the 1960s. The increase in the percentage limitation for gifts in 1964 was 
not extended to private  foundations,  as noted above.  In’addition,  the 
hearings  and  reports  on foundations  may  have had  an adverse  “an- 
nouncement effect” on new foundations by signaling more stringent regu- 
lations to come. 
Another deliterious effect seen as a possible result of the 1969 act was a 
drop in the rate at which individuals contributed to foundations. Labo- 
vitz’s survey supported this fear, showing that the percentage of founda- 
tions receiving any contributions had fallen from 1967 to 1970 and that 
the average size of contributions had fallen in all but one asset class (La- 
bovitz 1974, p. 99). In an attempt to provide a longer period for compari- 
son, table 7.10 shows gifts received as a percentage of  total assets of the 
large foundations covered in the Foundation Center’s periodic surveys. 
These figures do in fact show a drop in contributions relative to assets be- 
tween 1969 and 1972 as well as a lower rate of contributions after 1969. 
19. Since some foundations created during the 1950s no longer exist, these figures under- 
state the rate of births during that decade. 271  Foundations 
Table 7.10  Gifts Received by Large Foundations, Selected Years 
Number of  Gifts Received  As Percentage 

























Source: Foundation Directory, various years. See table 7.5. 
aYear is approximate. 
However, this time series is subject to the same kind of  bias affecting the 
comparison of payout rates over time. Because the sample size was re- 
duced after 1969, leaving larger average foundations, one would expect 
observed contribution rates to be lower. Consequently, these data do not 
allow a satisfactory test of whether contributions have fallen off as a re- 
sult of the 1969 tax act. The only comparable data on contributions re- 
ceived over time is Cushman’s (1979, pp. 162-63, table 6.4) finding that 
gifts received by a sample of 326 large foundations fell between 1968 and 
1973 from 15.1 to 8.3 percent of total income. The fall in stock prices over 
this period may have been a significant factor in this comparison, howev- 
er. 
7.3.3  Other Effects 
There is some evidence that foundation behavior was influenced in oth- 
er ways by the 1969 tax act. In general, however, these effects do not lend 
themselves readily to measurement. Labovitz’s (1974) survey results sug- 
gest, for example, that many foundations modified their grant making as 
a result of the act’s requirement to exercise “expenditure responsibility” 
over grants not made to exempt charities. As a result of  the requirement, 
some foundations apparently shied away from making grants to contro- 
versial or unusual organizations (pp. 82-85). The survey results also indi- 
cate an increase in legal and administrative costs as a result of the act, 
though these could well have been short-term effects (pp. 78-82).’’  There 
was little evidence that the requirements to divest certain stock, imposed 
as they were over a long period, had had much effect by 1970 (pp. 94-98). 
One other measure for the cumulative effect of these and other restric- 
tions imposed by the 1969 act is the rate at which foundations terminate 
operations. Simon presented data to suggest that this death rate had risen 
20. Cushman (1979, pp. 166-67,  table 6.5) reports for his sample of 326 large foundations 
that the ratio of expenses to income rose from 7.0 to 12.2 percent between 1968 and 1973. 212  Foundations 
steeply since 1969 (U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance  1973, p.  174). 
While this is suggestive, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions with- 
out a longer time series of observations on foundation deaths and births. 
More generally, it will be impossible to give a full assessment of the effect 
of the 1969 act without a more complete model of donors and foundations 
themselves. 
7.4  Conclusion 
The privileged position of  foundations as autonomous, undying, and 
tax-exempt entities was challenged by a comprehensive set of provisions in 
the Tax Reform Act of  1969. The bill appears to have been motivated in 
large part by the perception that, in many cases, the private foundation 
was “little more than a tax shelter” (testimony by Patricia Senger, U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Finance 1974b, p. 50). Since 1969 the Congress has 
softened the restrictions somewhat, but most of the 1969 provisions re- 
main in force. Because of the importance of the 1969 act, analysis of the 
effect of federal tax law on foundations must focus on the effects of these 
provisions. The chapter indicates quite clearly, however, that the analysis 
of these effects is severely hampered by the dearth of  useful data for ana- 
lyzing foundation behavior over time. Although  foundation tax forms 
provide the groundwork for a useful data set, the data in this area remain 
far less developed than those used in studying other areas of philanthropy. 
Based on the fragmentary data presented in this chapter, it appears that 
the 1969 act was successful in altering some forms of behavior by founda- 
tions anddheir donors without jeopardizing the continued use of the foun- 
dation form. Payout rates appear to have increased slightly due to the act. 
As for contributions to foundations, it is not clear whether they have risen 
or fallen overall as a result of  the 1969 act. It is not clear that the act has 
reduced the rate at which foundations are established. Nor does the in- 
crease in the real value of foundation assets since 1962 suggest that the 
1969 act has made foundations a dying breed. Given the available data, it 
appears indeed that the rumors of their demise may well have been exag- 
gerated. 